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In 2008, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and
the African Union (AU) established a joint technical taskforce to articulate a
mining vision for Africa. The resulting Africa Mining Vision (AMV), which
was adopted by African Heads of State and Government in February 2009,
was informed by the continent’s recognition of its enormous mineral potential,
the importance of mineral resources to Africa’s industrialisation and socio-
economic development, and the fact that in most African countries only very
little progress has been made to maximise the opportunities.1 The AMV
represents a “common voice” for Africa in the “negotiat[ion] of access to the
continent’s natural resource wealth”.2 Its central theory is that Africa’s mineral
resources can play a transformative role in Africa’s development only if
appropriate socio-economic development linkages that meet national and
regional developmental needs are established. It calls for a “[t]ransparent,
equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-
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based sustainable growth and socio-economic development”.3  The critical
question is: how can this vision be realised?
This article focuses on the role of government-initiated international
development think tanks in the realisation of the AMV. Although there is lack
of agreement about the meaning of think-tanks, the following definition by
the United Nations Development Programme is widely cited: think-tanks are
“organisations engaged on a regular basis in research and advocacy on any
matter related to public policy. They are the bridge between knowledge and
power in modern democracies.”4 Government-initiated international
development think-tanks refer to those think-tanks working in the field of
international development that do not merely receive government support,
but that were established by governments in partnership with the private
sector with the overarching goal of furthering the governments’ economic
diplomacy and overall foreign policy objectives. Two examples of such think-
tanks are Australia’s International Mining for Development Centre (IM4DC)
and the Canadian International Resources and Development Institute (CIRDI)
(formerly Canadian International Institute for Extractive Industries and
Development). IM4DC was established through an initiative of the Australian
Aid for International Development (AusAID) as part of the Australian
government’s Mining for Development Initiative which seeks to provide support
to developing countries to manage their extractive industries for economic
growth and poverty reduction. Its priorities include supporting the “Australian
government’s economic diplomacy agenda.”5
Similarly, CIRDI was established with funding from the now defunct
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for the exact goal that
IM4DC was established. This goal aligns with Canada’s new foreign aid policy,
which seeks to establish partnerships with the private sector in developing
countries in a bid to improve the development impact of the activities of
Canadian corporations in those countries. IM4DC and CIRDI are thus direct
implementations of their respective countries’ foreign aid policies. These
countries’ huge investments in African mining allude to the priority focus
areas of their two think-tanks.
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This article critically reviews the programmes and strategies of IM4DC
and CIRDI with a view to analysing how they could contribute to the realisation
of the AMV. Notably, both think-tanks are relatively new – IM4DC was
established in 2011 and CIRDI in 2013. This makes it premature to assess
their impact on their partner countries at this time. Nonetheless, it remains
worthwhile to take a close look at their programmes, strategies and outcomes
to evaluate their potential to contribute to the realisation of the AMV. In what
ways can they be made more effective for the realisation of the AMV? The
paper then proceeds to discuss how African countries can take optimal
advantage of the opportunities created by the establishment of these think-
tanks in order to realise the goals of the AMV.
Section 2 of this article reviews the main components of the AMV as well
as its significance to Africa’s economic development strategy. Sections 3 and
4 review the programmes and strategies of IM4DC and CIRDI. The review of
programmes and strategies of the two think-tanks is extended in Section 5
with a view to identifying their strengths and weaknesses. This is then followed
in Section 6 by a discussion of how African countries can leverage the
opportunities presented by the programmes of these think-tanks to enhance
the realisation of the AMV. So far, the activities of the think-tanks have focused
primarily on capacity building. This section, therefore, focuses on how African
countries can harness the capacity building opportunities created by the think-
tanks. The discussion is centred on the use of local content requirements in
the mining sector. A broader discussion of how Africa can harness the potentials
of its mineral resources is beyond the scope of this paper. Section 7 concludes
the discussion.
2.  THE AMV
The AMV posits that achieving its goals requires strategies and interventions
coordinated at the continental level and implemented at the national and
sub-regional levels.6 It emphasises the need for “more fiscal space and
responsive taxation to allow host countries to better capture windfall gains
and to encourage the use of revenues for value addition and linkages.”7 It
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also emphasises other gains that can be derived from mining, through
“employment generation, local procurement of goods and services,
entrepreneurial development, skills and knowledge creation, technology
transfer, infrastructure expansion and above all linkages”.8 It identifies “critical
constraints and success factors’ for its realisation, namely, the quality of resource
potential data, capacity to negotiate contracts, resource development and
governance capacity, capacity to manage mineral wealth, infrastructural
constraints, and the challenges associated with artisanal and small-scale
mining.9 It further establishes a tentative framework for action to be fleshed
out and implemented at the regional and national levels.
The adoption of the vision has been described as a landmark in mining
sector governance in Africa and represents “a paradigm shift” from the neo-
liberal framework that has governed mineral development in Africa for
decades.10 Its adoption has been traced to an upswing in mineral prices in the
years before the global financial crisis of 2008 and the “yawning gap” between
the profits of the mining corporations and the revenues that accrued to African
governments.11 The vision is, therefore, a broad philosophical articulation of
the steps that African countries need to take in order to retain a greater share
of the revenues accruing from the development of its mineral resources.
In 2011, the AU and UNECA issued a report titled Minerals and Africa’s
Development: The International Study Group Report on Africa’s Mineral
Regimes, intended to serve as a reference to policy makers for the
implementation of the vision.12 This report formed the basis for an Action
Plan agreed to in December 2011 during the Second AU Conference of Ministers
Responsible for Mineral Development.13 At the Eighth African Development
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Forum in 2012, UNECA, supported by mining firm AngloGold Ashanti, launched
the African Mineral Skills Initiative (AMSI) as a vehicle for the implementation
of the AMV.14  The goal of AMSI is to reduce the skills shortage in the mining
sector in Africa. In December 2013, the African Minerals Development Centre
(AMDC) was established to coordinate all activities relating to the AMV’s
implementation. Regional economic communities as well as individual
countries are expected to design mechanisms for the implementation of the
AMV within their jurisdictions.
3.  UNDERSTANDING THINK-TANKS
The exact origin of think-tanks is not known. It is believed that the idea may
have originated from an Englishman named Thomas Clarkson, who in 1782
founded the Society for the Abolition of the African Slave Trade.15 Observably,
it was in the 20th century that think-tanks became prominent, foremost among
them being the RAND Corporation and the Brookings Institution established
in the United States. It has been said that most of the public policy great ideas
that drive the Western societies today, such as the ideas of Medicare and
Medicaid in the United States, originated from think-tanks.16
As earlier noted, there is a lack of agreement about the meaning of
think-tanks. McGann and Weaver’s definition of think-tanks as “non-
governmental, not-for-profit research organisations with substantial
organisational autonomy from government and from societal interests such
as firms, interest groups, and political parties”17 is widely referenced, despite
its shortcomings. Goodman has suggested that “[a] think tank is an
organisation that sponsors research on specific problems, encourages the
discovery of solutions, and facilitates interaction among scientists and
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intellectuals in pursuit of these goals.”18 Pautz has opined that “[t]he criterion
for a think-tank being a ‘non-governmental’ organisation is generally accepted
in the literature as long as this does not exclude organisations that receive
project and basic funding from governmental sources.”19 Pautz also questions
the “not-for-profit” criterion in the definition as irrelevant because, among
other things, it masks the fact that think-tanks always seek to gain something,
even if that thing is not financial gain.20 Pautz suggested the following detailed
definition:
Think-tanks are non-governmental institutions; intellectually,
organisationally and financially autonomous from government,
political parties or organised interests; and set up with the aim of
influencing policy. They have no formal decision-making power
and claim political neutrality while often making no secret of
their ideological standpoints. Some carry out little research
themselves and commission external experts or recycle existing
research, while others have considerable internal research
capacities. Furthermore, think-tanks want to change policy through
intellectual argument rather than through behind-the-scenes
lobbying. They employ rhetoric of public spirit and of the “common
good”. They advocate ideas, develop and maintain policy networks,
and provide expertise to policymakers. They inform decision makers
about policy developments from other countries and can thus
facilitate policy learning.21
Apparent in the definitions is that think-tanks are varied and they can be
private sector-initiated or government-initiated. Funding source would appear
to be irrelevant to the understanding of which organisation qualifies as a
think-tank. University institutes, management consultancies within the policy
advice arena,22 policy research institutions such as the British Institute of
International Affairs and government contract research institutions, such as
the RAND Corporation and the Canadian Institute for International Peace and
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Security23 are regarded as think-tanks. So are advocacy groups such as the
Heritage Foundation and the Institute for Policy Studies24 and international
development agencies/institutes such as the United States’ Centre for Global
Development and Canada’s International Development Research Centre. Both
IM4DC and CIRDI would also qualify as international development think-
tanks.
4.  AN OVERVIEW OF IM4DC AND CIRDI
AND THEIR PROGRAMMES
4.1 IM4DC
IM4DC was established by the Australian government in 2011 through an
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) initiative with the
principal goal of assisting mineral-rich developing countries in lifting the
quality of life of their local populations through a more sustainable use of
their mineral resources.25 It is a major component of Australia’s Mining for
Development Initiative under which Australia intends to “share its significant
expertise and experience in mining to assist resource-rich developing countries
maximise the benefits and opportunities of mining.”26 AusAID committed the
sum of AUD31million to the Centre, to be paid in four tranches: AUD7million
in October 2011, AUD7million in July 2012, AUD8million in July 2013 and
AUD 9 million in July 2014.27 The UWA and the University of Queensland
collaboratively operate the Centre, with its headquarters at the University of
Western Australia (UWA). Owing to a non-renewal of funding by AusAID
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after the last tranche of funds was paid in July 2014, IM4DC suspended (or
completed) its activities in mid-2015. However, in order to continue the work
of IM4DC pending when further funding becomes available, the two partner
institutions, in partnership with other agencies, institutions and donors, formed
the Minerals and Energy for Development Alliance. Their work builds on the
momentum created by IM4DC.28
IM4DC is aligned closely with AusAID’s development assistance
programmes and is committed to engaging closely with AusAID to ensure
optimal realisation of the goals of those programmes. Specifically, it includes
AusAID’s Sustainable Mining Initiative aimed at expanding its programmes
in the minerals and petroleum sector in developing countries, particularly
Africa, and at contributing to the improvement of Australia’s reputation in
the mining sector.29 According to IM4DC’s AusAID Activity Proposal, it
represents a paradigm shift in Australia’s Official Development Assistance
(ODA) in that, rather than being oriented towards achieving Australia’s
business growth goals, it focuses on “delivering outcomes that will benefit
Australia through the benefits that accrue to the receiving countries.”30
IM4DC’s work is organised around three themes, namely, governance
and regulation, community and environmental sustainability, and operational
effectiveness.31 Under the first theme, it is believed that in order for mineral
development to bring prosperity to global-south countries, there is a need to
establish a sustainable governance mechanism that effectively accounts for
resource revenues while promoting safe, healthy, gender-sensitive, ethnically
inclusive, environmentally friendly and socially responsible development.32
The second theme (community and environmental sustainability) recognises
the potential of mineral resources to contribute positively to local resource
bases while simultaneously impacting negatively on specific areas. This theme,
therefore, focuses on addressing the negative impacts of mineral development
on local communities and the environment. The third theme (operational
effectiveness) recognises that much of the expertise and technology needed to
effectively develop the minerals industry is not available in developing
countries.33 It, therefore, focuses on how to deploy Australian expertise and
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technology to assist developing countries in growing their minerals sector.
IM4DC’s strategy for the implementation of the above objectives includes
the organisation of education and training programmes on core issues relevant
to mining development, tailored to meet the specific needs of developing
countries (such as study tours for mining stakeholders in specific countries).
Short mining courses are organised both in Australia and in the developing
countries. The strategy also includes the organisation of a Distinguished
Fellowship Programme in Australia for influential stakeholders in the mining
industry; an action research programme to strengthen the capacity of
developing countries in specific areas; an annual international mining for
development conference held in Australia; and the provision of technical
advice to the Australian government.34
As stated in its 2013 report, IM4DC has hosted two international
conferences and 11 fellowships in Australia, and organised 30 short courses,
workshops and study tours, with 900 participants from 36 developing countries
in attendance.35 Sometimes, the study tours have involved high- level
government officials from developing countries. In 2012, for example, 20
Ugandan parliamentarians and government officials, led by Uganda’s Energy
Minister, were in Australia to study the legislative and governance frameworks
for Australia’s extractive industries.36 Some of the issues dealt with in the
short courses include: extractive industries negotiation skills, geographic
information systems, relations with indigenous peoples, environmental and
social aspects of bauxite mining and mine closure, and management of large
volume wastes.37 The courses and study tours are intended to be a learning
experience for the participants, an experience that they are expected to use in
their home countries. They are thus essentially capacity building programmes.
IM4DC has made conscious effort to raise its profile in Africa. This is
demonstrated by the fact that among the 42 countries where it carries on its
activities, 26 are African.38 It has established a number of collaborations
with African universities, such as the University of Zambia, the Copperbelt
University (also in Zambia) and the University of Mines and Technology,
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Ghana.39 It is currently concluding partnership agreements with the AMDC
and the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning for the
purpose of implementing the AMV.40 The collaboration will, among other
things, facilitate the further development of short courses, research and staff
development for Africans.
4.2 The CIRDI
Shortly before the merger between CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Trade and Development Canada (DFATD) in 2013, CIDA initiated the creation
of CIRDI. It focused on “help[ing] resource-rich developing countries [to]
make better use of and derive more benefit from their extractive sectors in
order to reduce poverty and stimulate sustainable economic growth” (DFATD,
2014a).41 The institute, headquartered at the University of British Columbia
and managed collaboratively with Simon Fraser University and École
Polytechnique de Montreal, works in three areas: natural resource governance,
environmental protection, and economic development and diversification. Its
take-off funding was a US$24.6 million contributed by CIDA in May 2013
over a five-year period (2013–2018).42 It works in partnership with the
Canadian government, civil society and industry, and undertakes projects
funded by DFATD, its own partners and other development organisations.43 It
is aligned with Canada’s corporate social responsibility strategy titled Building
the Canadian Advantage: A CSR Strategy for the Canadian Extractive Sector
Abroad, unveiled in March 2009 and revised in November 2014. The CSR
“aims to improve the competitive advantage of Canadian extractive sector
companies by enhancing their ability to manage social and environmental
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risks” (DFATD, 2009).44 Observably, it also intends to contribute to the
implementation of Canada’s new foreign aid policy, which places great
emphasis on partnerships with the private sector in developing countries,
towards enhancing the development impact of the operations of Canadian
companies in those countries.45
CIRDI’s programmes are organised around four themes, namely,
sustainable development and governance of the extractive sector,
transformation of artisanal and small-scale mining, multi-stakeholder
integration of extractive projects in communities, and economic diversification
and local supply chains. The practical steps required to deliver these
programmes are less explicit and concrete than those of IM4DC, but they are
described as “adopting diverse perspectives and inclusive approaches, and
working across many disciplines.”46 In February 2014, at the behest of six
civil society organisations, the Institute organised a participatory workshop
for community members and government representatives in Portovelo, Ecuador,
on business opportunities and local entrepreneurship programmes that promote
local economic diversification. In July 2015, it organised a summer institute,
a learning event in Vancouver, Canada, on resource governance part of a 10-
day pilot programme involving 31 participants from 17 developing countries.47
It is collaborating with the Ministry of Mines in Kenya to prepare a mineral
audit report for the Kenyan government.48 The Institute intends to establish
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an International Training Centre for Artisanal Mining that will serve as a
training ground for artisanal miners to enable them evolve into successful
mining entrepreneurs.49
Unlike IM4DC, however, most of CIRDI’s activities are currently
concentrated in Latin America, although its stated regional focus comprises
Africa (35%), Americas (35%) and Asia (30%).50 Among Canada’s 25
development countries of focus, 10 are African countries.51 In February 2014,
the Institute signed a letter of intent with AMDC to cooperate on the
implementation of the AMV. Areas of interest include the development of
policy and regulatory frameworks, geological information systems, mining
governance and stakeholder participation, and human and institutional
capacity building.52
4.3 A Critique of IM4DC’s and CIRDI’s Programmes and
Strategies
To be clear, the foregoing strategies and programmes are laudable. Workshops
and trainings (which are often accompanied by scholarships to make them
cost-free for the participants) are certainly useful in reducing poverty and
inequality in Africa. They would be most effective if they are designed to offer
training first and foremost to mining industry personnel as well as personnel
of government mining agencies and departments who would return to their
jobs at the end of their programme to utilise the knowledge and skills acquired.
CIRIDI’s summer institute (earlier referred to) is commendable, as the
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participants included extractive industry professionals from government, civil
society and academia who had a role to play in shaping the mining industry
in their countries. Also, IM4DC’s programme on strengthening geoscientific
knowledge53 is noteworthy, as it would help to improve geological information
available to host governments. Such information can contribute to increasing
the capacity of host governments in negotiating with mining companies.54
However, these workshops and trainings should also be extended to persons
who are not already mining industry personnel. For these latter participants,
incentives, such as an absorption plan into the local workforce, to be
undertaken by the recipient country, should accompany the capacity building,
so that the country can benefit from them. This can help to address the problem
associated with, “the migration of skilled workers abroad”. For instance,
Kaplan decried migration as a major factor aggravating the skills shortage
in South Africa, pointing out specifically how Australia has been successful
in recruiting South African skilled workers.55 This brain drain is a marked
obstacle to the realisation of the AMV.
In addition, it does not appear that the activities of these think-tanks are
well integrated into the private sector and local communities in developing
countries. Their major partners have been government institutions: ministries,
departments and agencies as well as public universities. Partnerships with
local communities and local artisanal and small-scale miners seem minimal.
In a 2013 study of Canadian and Australian mining sector-related development
initiatives abroad, Marcano found that Canada Building the Canadian
Advantage initiative placed more emphasis on working more closely with
Canadian mining companies and non-governmental organisations abroad.56
Dissimilarly, Australia’s Mining for Development initiative had placed more
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emphasis on working directly with other governments to support the
development of the mining sector in those countries. She described the
Canadian initiative as “an initiative, which gives a strong focus to protecting
Canadian private investments abroad.”57 Arguably, it is this sort of lack of
[adequate] engagement with the local communities and the private sector in
developing countries that has prompted scholars such as Stone to dispel as
“myth,” the idea that think-tanks act in the public interest, “being a conduit
for public participation and force for democratic consolidation.”58
Nevertheless, building the capacity of government institutions is critical
to the realisation of the AMV. This is because, like other countries transitioning
from a state- to a market-based economy, African countries are forced to
introduce new institutions required for its smooth running and must learn to
design and implement a new set of socio-economic instruments.59 Policy makers
in such countries are generally ill prepared for this challenge, “since their
education, training and experience” are inadequate for it.60 Think-tanks can
play a transformative role by assisting African policy makers to face this
challenge.61 According to the UNDP, think-tanks “are the bridge between
knowledge and power in modern democracies”.62 They “represent a vital
component of successes of policies directed towards harmonisation of existing
practices with contemporary paradigms of good governance and economic
management.”63
Furthermore, governance, understood as “the systems of authoritative
norms, rules, institutions, and practices by means of which any collectivity,
from the local to the global, manages its common affairs”,64 is one of the
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65 ECA & AU (n 53).
66 ibid.
67 Natasha Odendaal, “New initiative to boost ‘mineral skills’ in Africa” Mining
Weekly (23 October 2012), <www.miningweekly.com/article/new-initiative-
launched-to-boost-mineral-skills-in-africa-2012-10-23> accessed 19 February
2016 (quoting Richard Duffy, AngloGold Ashanti executive vice president for
Africa).
major challenges to sustainable mineral resource development in Africa.65
The most important institutions are those with responsibility for regulating
the environmental impact of mineral development, those with responsibility
for designing mineral fiscal regimes and for collecting and auditing mineral
revenue, those in charge of geological survey, and those that offer training in
science and technology.66 Observably, for these institutions to be effectively
strengthened, appropriate linkages between them and the private sector need
to be developed to foster interactions between them that would facilitate
knowledge sharing. Moreover, as recognised by AMSI, capacity building, or
“mineral skills”, should be viewed holistically to include not only engineering
and geological skills, but also capacity in such areas as “strategic planning,
law, finance, fiscal policy, environment, community affairs and human rights”.67
Moreover, to effectively build the capacity of government institutions, the
private sector and local communities in the mining sector in Africa must be
treated as a source of vital knowledge. This entails think-tanks’ active
engagement with these two entities.
Genuine development aid must be geared towards assisting African
countries to take ownership of the development of their resources, to mark an
end to or reduce Africa’s dependence on foreign investors. Certainly, due to
the capital intensive nature of mineral development and the level of technical
knowhow required, increasing Africa’s ownership of its mineral sector is a
huge challenge. In the short term, foreign companies operating in Africa
would necessarily have to import much of their expertise and technology. In
the long term, however, the goal must be to develop in-country expertise and
technology through incremental knowledge transfer, as this would potentially
broaden the possibilities for Africa to take ownership of its resources.
This would entail bringing African mining companies into the centre of
capacity building programmes to enable them grow gradually in skills
acquisition and improve their capital base. This does not seem to be on the
front burner of IM4DC and CIRDI programmes. Instead, the primary target of
the programmes comprises mostly government institutions. As IM4DC noted
in its 2014 mid-term review, industry has expressed concern over their lack of
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Development” in Brian Tomlinson (ed), Aid and the Private Sector: Catalysing
Poverty Reduction and Development? Reality of Aid 2012 Report (IBON
International, 2012) 69, <www.realityofaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/
02/ROA_Report_2012-Aid_and_the_Private_Sector1-final.pdf> accessed 19
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integration into IM4DCs activities.68  IM4DC concedes that this is “a serious
weak point” in its activities; but it seeks to defend this weakness by attributing
the minimal involvement of industry to “instructions from AusAID from the
early days” of IM4DCs establishment.69 Such an instruction cannot be
understood, given that a major part of IM4DCs work is to deliver aid to
developing countries through establishing partnerships with the private sector
in those countries. If the industry, the major player in the private sector in
developing countries, is kept, as a matter of the Australian government policy,
at the fringes of IM4DCs activities, then the genuineness of the development
aid policy is suspect. This likely explains why some critics have described the
shift from government-to-government development aid delivery to the use of
the private sector, such as think-tanks, as a calculated strategy by developed
countries to avoid directly regulating the activities of their extractive companies
abroad, with Parfitt, Bryant & Barrett (2011:69)70 calling it “a flawed
development model”.
To be sure, establishing institutional links is important, for it gives think-
tanks the political protection they sorely needed to carry on their activities
effectively. But a desperate focus on establishing links with government
institutions might undermine a think-tanks’ ability to identify the exact type
of capacity that needs strengthening. Indeed, more often than not, the
government institutions in developing countries are too far removed from the
local communities and the industry to know what their real needs are.
Programmes that are more community-oriented, which engage adequately
with local industry and that strengthen the capacity of local mining companies
to acquire the expertise and other wherewithal to undertake large-scale mining
projects ought to be given priority and vigorously promoted. It is such
programmes that have the capacity to give foreign mining companies the
profoundly needed social license to operate.
Moreover, capacity building has largely been treated, as something needed
only by developing countries. But the reality is that the capacity of foreign
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2016.
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The Nation (25 June 2013), <www.thenation.com/article/174980/secret-
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2016.
75 D. Byers, “Goldberg slams Brookings, via Qatar”, Politico, 2 May 2013,
<www.politico.com/blogs/media/2013/05/goldberg-slams-brookings-via-qatar-
163106.html> accessed 19 January 2016.
mining companies operating in Africa to understand the complexity of the
communities in which they operate and to understand how to manage the
multiplicity of interests involved to avoid social tensions and violent
confrontations that all too often lead to internecine conflicts also needs
strengthening. The heterogeneous nature of African local communities and
the multiplicity of interests this produces, as illustrated by several studies,71
render company-community relations in the mineral sector especially
difficult.72 Government-initiated international development think-tanks ought,
therefore, to consider programmes and strategies to assist their companies
operating in Africa to strengthen their capacity – particularly their social
capacity – to operate in those countries.
Another concern relates to the impact of government funding of these
think-tanks on their effectiveness. To be clear, while the source of think-tank
funding has been of concern to many observers, its influence on their activities
is for the most part a matter of presumption. Many commentators believe
that governments and their agencies have vested interests that may impede
their fund recipients independence and may directly influence the policy
recommendations that result.73 Two US think-tanks were strongly censured in
2013 for accepting money from Taiwan74 and Qatar.75 In India, a think-tank
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must obtain government approval before accepting foreign funding.76
Although these cases relate to think tanks that accepted funding from
foreign governments, they demonstrate concern that funding source matters,
even within government circles. Stone however argues “[t]he notion that a
think tank requires independence from the state in order to be ‘free-thinking’
is an Anglo-American norm that does not translate well into other political
cultures.”77 But she equally notes that think- tanks “sponsored and funded by
international organisations and donor groups tend to be well institutionalised,
mainstream institutes whose research agendas concord in considerable degree
with the policy interests of their funding source.”78
Indeed, funding source matters. AusAID’s instruction to IM4DC to engage
only minimally with industry and IM4DCs apparent compliance with that
bidding is a clear demonstration that funding source matters. Although IM4DC
has pledged to give industry greater opportunity to participate in its programmes
and planning,79 it remains to be seen whether this will go down well with
AusAID and to what extent IM4DC would allow industry such opportunities.
With regard to CIRDI, critics have argued that CIRDIs funding from the
Canadian government “compromises its independence” and may lead it to
place Canadian economic interests over the interests of the local populations
in countries of operation.80 Former University of British Columbia president,
Stephen Toope, however, is reported to have rebutted this argument, describing
CIRDI as, “an independent academic centre [that] is not an instrument of the
government of Canada”.81 At the end of 2018 when CIDAs funding will
terminate, CIRDI will be expected to become self-sustaining, relying on
“expanded service offerings and … the support of multiple stakeholders”
(CIRDI, 2014d).82 These multiple stakeholders, it can be presumed, would
include external funding agencies, Canadian mining companies and mining
industry associations. Balancing the interests of industry, government, the
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view/> accessed 20 January 2016.
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(2012) <www.lmis.gov.rw/scripts/publication/reports/Mining.pdf> accessed
20 January 2016.
academia and the local populations in developing countries (the avowed
targets of the institutes programs) must be difficult. Cooley and Ron have
consequently observed that in the effort to “reconcile material pressures with
normative motivations”, think- tanks “often produce outcomes dramatically
at odds with liberal expectations.”83
Still, “[a] little dependence”, as one scholar has pointed out, may be a
positive thing, as it could help to assure the availability of resources for more
relevant and worthy programmes.84 It becomes disconcerting when the
dependence rises to a level that the think-tanks programmes are predestined
to meet the often parochial expectations of its funders.85 This concern is
accentuated by the fact that CIRDI and IM4DC are integrated into the foreign
aid policy of their respective countries as an important tool of economic
diplomacy.
4.4 Harnessing the Opportunities of IM4DC and CIRDI:
Local Content Requirements
Despite the above criticisms, the importance of IM4DC and CIRDI in the
realisation of the AMV cannot be denied. The AMV recognises lack of
professional and technical capacity as a major factor hindering the ability of
most African countries to turn their mineral potential into reality. This lack
of capacity is probably most apparent and distressing in Rwanda, a country
whose professional class was virtually annihilated during the 1994 genocide.
A 2012 skills survey showed that the Rwandan mining sector alone had a
total skills gap of 2,721 labour units, resulting in almost complete reliance
on foreign mining professionals and technicians, but with the low salary
package offered in Rwanda, attracting highly skilled experts has been
difficult.86
The programmes developed by IM4DC and CIRDI can contribute to the
much-needed professional and technical capacity for their African partner
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countries. This may not happen unless African governments key prudently
into those programmes, through the development of policy and legal
frameworks, that integrate local capacity building into mining development
and expand opportunities for value addition in the mining sector. Local skills
have been developed through the establishment of educational institutions
and skills acquisition centres as well as the sort of trainings that IM4DC and
CIRDI have engaged in. An approach increasingly being embraced by many
countries, global-north or south, involves local content requirements (LCRs).
LCRs are designed to enable a country maximise the gains of Foreign
Direct Investments (FDI) by mandating the use of local firms in goods and
services procurement, employment of local populations and the use of local
raw materials by investors.87 It is conceptualised as the requirement that “a
given percentage of domestic value added or domestic components be embodied
in a specified final product”.88 LCRs represent a form of intervention known
as “productive development policies” whose goal is to “strengthen the
productive structure of a particular national economy.”89 They are undertaken
to: (1) increase the participation of the domestic industry in specific sectors
of national economic activity; (2) improve national technological
development; (3) create job opportunities for nationals to improve their
livelihood; (4) support economic diversification and thereby reduce over-
dependence on one sector by strengthening the value-creating capacity of a
particular sector; and (5) enhance the capacity of domestic companies to
compete regionally and internationally.90 The requirements are either
87 G. Ugo Nwokeji, “The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the
Development of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry: History, Strategies and
Current Directions” (Paper presented at the James A Baker III Institute for
Public Policy, Rice University, March 2007) <http://bakerinstitute.org/media/
files/page/9b067dc6/noc_nnpc_ugo.pdf> accessed 29 January 2016.
88 G. M. Grossman, “The Theory of Domestic Content Protection and Content
Preference” (1981) 6(4) Quarterly Journal of Economics 583.
89 A. Melo & A. Rodriguez-Clare, “Productive Development Policies and Supporting
Institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean”, (Inter-American Development
Bank Research Department Competitive Studies Series Working Paper C-106,
February 2006) 5 <www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubc-106.pdf>
accessed 29 January 2016.
90 Silvana Tordo et al, Local Content Policies in the Oil and Gas Sector, World Bank
Study, (Washington, DC, 2013) <www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/07/12/000445729_ 20130712141852/
Rendered/PDF/789940REVISED000Box377371B00PUBLIC0.pdf> accessed
29 January 2016; International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
Association, “Local Content Strategy: A Guidance Document for the Oil and Gas
Industry” (2011) <www.ipieca.org/publication/local-content-strategy-
guidance-document-oil-and-gas-industry> accessed 29 January 2016.
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implanted in contractual agreements between governments and companies
or enacted legislatively. Sometimes they are established in bidding
requirements as part of the criteria for winning contracts or, more indirectly,
established in regulations and tax regimes that discriminate in favour of
local industries.91
Many African countries have adopted LCRs in one form or another, but
few apply it in the mining sector. In Nigeria, for instance, it has been adopted
only in relation to the oil and gas industry, under the Nigerian Oil and Gas
Industry Content Development Act, 2010. The Nigerian Minerals and Mining
Act, 2007 merely requires the responsible Minister to “introduce investment
friendly local content measures for mining projects” and to “facilitate the
development of indigenous technical and professional manpower required in
the mineral resources sector” (section 4(q) and (r)). These provisions are
largely discretionary and are not to be compared, in substance, form or
scope, with the provisions of the oil and gas content law. The latter specifically
and explicitly mandates oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria to meet
specified local content levels in matters of employment and procurement of
goods and services.
In 2015, the Tanzanian government enacted a new petroleum law
containing provisions for LCRs,92 suggesting that the application of LCRs
would be limited to the oil and gas industry. LCR in the mining sector would
remain limited to the lean and, to an extent, even discretionary provisions
contained in Tanzania’s Mining Act, 2010.93
In Zimbabwe, LCRs are evident in the Mines and Minerals Act. This
requires mineral rights applicants to show information on the extent to which
91 WTI Advisors, “Local Content Requirements and the Green Economy” (Paper
presented at the Ad Hoc Expert Group Meeting on Domestic Requirements and
Support Measures in Green Sectors: Economic and Environmental Effectiveness
and Implications for Trade, 13–14 June 2013, Salle XXI, Palais des Nations Geneva)
<http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Contribution/DITC_TED_13062013_
Study_WTI.pdf> accessed 29 January 2016; See, also, Chilenye Nwapi, “Defining
the ‘Local’ in Local Content Requirements in the Oil and Gas and Mining Sectors in
Developing Countries” (2015) 8(1) Law & Development Rev 191.
92 The Petroleum Act, 2015, Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania No 22 Vol.
96 dated 29th May, 2015, <www.policyforum-tz.org/sites/default/files/
BILLpetroleumACT2015UpdatedVersion15615.pdf> accessed 29 March 2016.
93 For instance, section 10(4)(e) of the Act authorises the Minister of Mines to
enter into a development agreement with a holder of or applicant for a mineral
right, which may contain binding provisions that “guarantee procurement of
goods and services available in the United Republic”. See, also, sections 44(v)
and 49(h) of the Act.
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local goods and services would be utilised in the development and operation
of their mine. It further requests details of the labour needs of the proposed
mine, including the number of foreign staff to be hired and any proposals for
training Zimbabweans.94
In South Africa, LCRs express themselves in the Broad-Based Socio-
Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining and Minerals
Industry, otherwise known as the South African Mining Charter (introduced
in 2002 and amended in 2010)95 and in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources
Development Act, 2002. Although these were cast in the context of historical
discriminatory social and labour practices in South Africa, they serve as LCR
implementation instruments.
In Ghana, the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 requires mineral rights
holders to give preference to made-in-Ghana products, service agencies and
companies and partnerships in the procurement of goods and services. In
matters of employment it requires mining companies to have a minimum
proportion of Ghanaian staff in all categories of employment (subject to
some exemptions).96 In Zambia, LCRs are found in the local procurement
requirements contained in Zambia’s Mines and Minerals Development Act,
2008.97 Guinea,98 Senegal99 and Sierra Leone100 also have similar provisions
in their mining codes.
As the World Bank has noted, while many West African countries have
adopted LCRs, the provisions of their LCRs are “insufficiently developed,
disseminated, monitored, and enforced.”101 Although the Bank was speaking
94 Mines and Minerals Act 2008, Title 21, s 159(3)(xii) and (xiii),
<www.osall.org.za/docs/2011/03/Zimbabwe_Mines_and_Minerals_Act_
Chap_21_05.pdf> accessed 29 March 2016.
95 South African Department of Mineral Resources Broad-Based Socio-Economic
Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining and Minerals Industry
(amended), Department of Mineral Resources, 2010, <www.gov.za/sites/
www.gov.za/files/33573_838.pdf> accessed 29 January 2016.
96 Minerals and Mining Act, 2006, Act 703, s 50, <www.sdsg.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/06/Ghana-Minerals-Act-2006.pdf> accessed 29 March 2016.
97 Act No 7 of 2008, s 25(g)–(h), <www.zambialii.org/files/zm/legislation/act/
2008/7/mamda2008295.pdf> accessed 29 March 2016.
98 Mining Code, 2013, Law L/2013/053/CNT of 8 April 2013.
99 Mining Code Law n2003-36 of November 24, 2003, <www.gouv.sn/IMG/
pdf/CODEMINIER_03_36.pdf> accessed 29 March 2016.
100 Mines and Minerals Act, 2009, Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol.
CXLI, No. 3, ss 96(2)(1) and (j), 106(2)(i) and (j), <www.sierra-leone.org/
Laws/2009-12.pdf> accessed 29 March 2016.
101 World Bank, Increasing Local Procurement by the Mining Industry in West Africa,
Report No. 66585-AFR, January 2012, p. 46, <http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTENERGY2/Resources/8411-West_Africa.pdf>.
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of West Africa, the situation is not likely better in other African countries and
might even be worse in some. In the case of Rwanda, for instance, one expected
that its 2014 mining law102 would chart an effective legal course for the
rebuilding of Rwanda’s capacity and set the framework for effective value
addition in the mining sector. Instead, the legal provisions regarding value
addition to Rwanda’s economy are rather timidly worded. Article 50 of the
law provides that “a mineral licence may include provisions requiring the
holder” to consider the feasibility of processing and refining the mineral
products in Rwanda, the goal being to add value to Rwandan economy. The
use of the liberal word “may” implies that the responsible Minister is not
under obligation to require mineral licence holders to give first consideration
to the feasibility of processing and refining their products in Rwanda before
considering elsewhere. A bold and more stringent provision permitting
processing and refining outside Rwanda only where these are not feasible in
Rwanda is what is needed. The government would then have to support the
gradual realisation of the goal of such a requirement by providing incentives
to companies to establish processing and refining plants in Rwanda and
prescribing a time limit for them to do so.
In Ghana, however, steps are being taken, in consultation with
stakeholders in the mining sector, to create regulation to give effect to the
LCR provisions of the Ghanaian mining code. A key element of this effort is
the requirement for mining companies to submit and report on a local
procurement plan.103 With support from the International Finance Corporation,
the Ghana Chamber of Mines has begun identifying opportunities for increasing
supply and assessing support needs of local businesses.104
As the World Bank has further observed, “there is limited participation in
mining supply chains by companies based in West Africa, despite existing
capacity and the potential to create further capacity.”105 The Bank notes that
few mining companies in West Africa have a clear policy on supporting local
procurement. Instead, their procurement strategy is motivated primarily by
issues like cost competitiveness, efficient and timely delivery of goods and
services, security of supply and the need to obtain a social licence to ensure
continuity of operations. While these are legitimate motivations, particularly
102 Law No 13/2014 of 20/05/2014 on Mining and Quarry Operations,
<www.refworld.org/pdfid/53fb08cd4.pdf> accessed 29 March 2016.
103 World Bank (n 101).
104 ibid.
105 World Bank (n 101) viii.
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from a business perspective, they do not provide a solid foundation upon
which a country can build its economic development agenda. Accordingly,
the Bank posits that “[i]f countries in West Africa can meet, or even exceed,
the level of local procurement seen in countries such as Chile, Canada, and
Brazil, there is an opportunity for backward linkages to play a central role in
sustainable economic development.”106 These profit-motivated procurement
strategies adopted by companies cannot provide such backward linkages.
Without a clear value addition strategy implemented through, especially,
LCRs, African countries cannot harness the opportunities provided by the
activities of international development think-tanks, such as IM4DC and CIRDI.
Training programmes organised by these think- tanks would produce trainees
unable to find jobs because of the profit-motivated employment policies and
preferences of foreign mining companies operating in Africa. The potential
consequence is that the capacity that has been built through such programmes
fails to yield the desired result. African countries must, therefore, initiate
clear frameworks for measuring local content and defining thresholds for
value addition and local participation; and establish mechanisms for
monitoring compliance. AMSI can serve as a regional vehicle for coordinating
such frameworks and providing policy guidance to African countries.
As earlier indicated, AMSI adopts a holistic approach to capacity building
that focuses on such skills as mining leadership, strategy setting, administrative
and regulatory processes, planning and negotiation, and stakeholder and
community engagement.107 One of AMSIs priorities is to provide support for
educational institutions in Africa to access “curricula, innovative cross-sector
learning, organisational capacity building and leadership” relating to
mining.108  The significance of AMSI would lie in its ability to foster, through
its programmes, the availability of mineral skills for African countries. This
follows from one of the constraints to the success of LCRs in most African
countries, which is the absence of adequate human capital to fill the available
jobs and enable companies to fulfil their local content obligations.109 In
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107 ECA. “Africa Mineral Skills Initiative – Concept Note: Building Human Capacity
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VIII Event, 22 October 2012) <www1.uneca.org/Portals/adfviii/Documents/
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addition, foreign firms that undertake training of its employees have an
incentive to provide only firm-specific skills, thereby limiting the labour
mobility of the trainees and any benefits to local firms that may arise from
labour mobility.110 Through facilitating the availability of mineral skills, AMSI
can contribute to the success of LCRs in the mining sector in Africa.
5.  CONCLUSION
The realisation of the AMV requires concerted effort by all stakeholders.
While the primary stakeholders are African countries themselves, other
stakeholders include developed countries with investments in Africa’s mining
sector. As part of their economic diplomacy, some of these countries have
established international development think tanks as a vehicle to assist
developing countries where their mineral corporations operate. Australia’s
IM4DC and Canada’s CIRDI are quintessential examples of such think-tanks.
These two think-tanks have developed programmes and strategies that, despite
their shortcomings, have the potential to contribute to the realisation of the
AMV through the capacity building opportunities they create.
It behoves African governments to leverage the opportunities created by
the activities of these think-tanks while maximising the gains of foreign direct
investment in the mining sector. LCRs represent a very useful instrument that
African countries can utilise. The establishment of AMSI can enhance the
potential of LCRs in Africa to contribute to the realisation of the AMV.
110 Oliver Morrissey, “FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Few Linkages, Fewer Spill-overs”
(2012) 24 European Journal of Development Research, pp. 26-31.
